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ABSTRACT 
This research focuses on the analysis of political risk in the context of offshoring decisions. 
The study uses the Repertory Grid Technique (RGT), which entails a series of semi-
structured interviews exploring key political risks experiences across offshoring 
engagements. The research extends the spectrum of political risk analysis in the context of 
offshoring engagements, and explores the varied impact of political risk across business 
activity types. 
The research identifies five key political risks affecting offshoring engagements and 
highlights the moderating effect of specific offshoring activity types Business Process 
Outsourcing (BPO), Information Technology Outsourcing (ITO) or Knowledge Process 
Outsourcing (KPO) on political risk implications.  The research explores the conditioning 
effect of activity specific exposure to political risk and enhances the explanatory ability of 
the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) constructs, offering a novel operationalization of the 
political risk component of external uncertainty. 
From a practical perspective, the research highlights the need for developing managerial 
tools to improve monitoring and identification of risks. The key practical contribution is the 
development of differentiated political risk typologies that can capture the nuances of 
external risks in offshoring, allowing for more accurate risk assessment of offshoring 
decisions. 
 1 INTRODUCTION 
Offshoring is often driven by the objective of finding more cost effective production or 
processing solutions by identifying and exploiting cost arbitrage between regions, including 
low cost skilled labour, low cost raw material and other economic factors (Walker and 
Weber, 1984; Lewin and Peeters, 2006; Ellram et al., 2008; Tate, et al. 2009). Therefore, 
offshoring initiatives have traditionally focused on cost reductions by relocating subsidiary 
facilities, or outsourcing production or services to suppliers in low cost countries. Evolving 
research further indicates that offshoring is not only driven by cost considerations, but also 
increasingly by accessibility to ideas and human capital or to gain access to developing 
markets (Ellram et al., 2008; McIvor, 2009; Tate and Ellram, 2009).  However, offshoring 
decisions also expose firms to many risks, which in turn can have a detrimental effect on 
firm’s supply chain performance (e.g., Wagner and Bode, 2008; Wilson, 2007) and firms’ 
financial performance (e.g. Hendricks and Singhal, 2003; Altay and Ramirez, 2010; Li et al., 
2015; Zsidisin, Petkova and Dam, 2016) 
In an extensive review of the supply chain risk literature, Ho et al. (2015) identify macro-
risks, which include natural risks and man-made risks, such as war, terrorism and political 
instability, as one of the key risk categories that have so far received limited attention.  In 
this research we address this gap by investigating the link between political risk and 
offshoring activities. Specifically we seek to identify and categorize events that constitute 
political risk and how these risk manifestations affect offshoring operations. The study 
paves the way for a deeper and more diversified understanding of political risk impact on 
offshoring, contributing to the development of more resilient supply chains (Christopher 
and Peck, 2004; Ambulkar, 2015; Tukamuhabwa, et al. 2015). 
As emphasized by Kobrin (1979: 77), ‘we need to be concerned not with political events but 
their potential manifestations as constraints upon foreign investors’. From this notion follows 
that changes in the political environment, that do not change the business environment, do 
not represent political risk.  Nor is political risk for one firm necessarily a risk for another 
firm, meaning that political risk is firm specific (Robock, 1971).  The correlation between 
outputs of the political system (and social environment), and the corresponding business 
risk implications provide a framework for a more detailed classification of political risks. 
The proposed research will be guided by the following research question: 
 What are the key contingent political risk types impacting on offshoring engagements? 
Following this introduction we present a review of the literature on offshoring and its links 
to political risk.  This is followed by a description of the research methods used, including 
data collection and analysis consideration.  The findings are then presented and discussed 
in light of the extant literature. The final section presents the conclusions and contributions 
of the study. 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Offshoring strategies 
The term offshoring strategies refer to the geographic transfer of a company’s operations 
outside the borders of its home country (Grappi et al. 2013), fundamentally meaning 
exposure to a foreign environment.  The extant literature in this field reaffirms the 
relevance of analysing extrinsic risks such as political instability and legal infrastructure in 
the vendors’ host countries, including differences in legislation towards intellectual 
property rights, labour contracting and employment law (Weiss and Azaran, 2007). The 
need to conduct country risk analysis for offshoring engagements, looking at political risk 
that can impact on partner company performance, is well established (Goodman and Ramer, 
2007). Despite the relevance of researching external uncertainties relating to offshoring, 
limited research has been focused on assessing the specific risk sources and consequences 
of political risks facing offshoring firms across different business activities and engagement 
forms (Alon and Herbert, 2009).  
While offshoring has traditionally been associated with the manufacturing industry, the 
offshoring of business services has seen a similar dramatic growth over the years, 
transforming the way businesses are managing their operations in an increasingly 
globalized world (Ellram, et al., 2008; Tate and Ellram, 2009). The offshore service industry 
has been driven by technology improvements lifting constraints on geography, time and 
communication expense, allowing suppliers to easily connect with customers across the 
globe, giving service offshoring both scale and momentum (Lewin and Peeters, 2006; 
Modarress, 2007; Tate and Ellram, 2009). As technologies in ICT introduced digitalization, 
services no longer needed to be done in situ and it is possible to separate segments of 
 service processes for offshoring. The growth rate of service offshoring underlines the 
relevance of expanding research towards investigating industry specific risks. 
Offshore outsourced services are often classified into Information Technology Outsourcing 
(ITO), Business Process Outsourcing (BPO), and Knowledge Process Outsourcing (KPO) 
(Lacity et al. ,2008; Youngdahl and Ramaswamy, 2008). The three categories compound 
specific properties that potentially may vary in their exposure to the external environment, 
hence the following research will maintain a category specific distinction between 
transactional services, mainly ITO and BPO, and complex research-based services 
represented by KPO.  
2.2 Transaction cost economics (TCE) and offshoring 
The Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) approach focuses on the cost of each contract i.e. the 
process of supplier evaluation, negotiation and monitoring (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1995; 
Williamson, 2002). These costs relate to the ‘transaction’ of the process, and appear both 
when engaging with markets (outsourcing) and in a hierarchy (internalization). The TCE 
approach fundamentally focuses on the identification of the governance structure that 
entails the least cost per transaction. The transactions take place in an environment based 
on information asymmetry and bounded rationality (Ellram et al., 2008) and the 
characteristics of transactions focus on asset specificity, uncertainty, performance 
measurement and frequency (Williamson, 1979; 2000). Empirical studies have supported 
the basic principles of transaction cost variables (Aubert et al., 2004) and TCE attributes are 
considered key in determining the governance form of the contract. Based on this logic, TCE 
predicts outsourcing to prevail for transactions of low-frequency, characterized by a low 
level of uncertainty, with few transaction specific investments and simple performance 
measurement requirements. Alternatively, when frequency is high, the firm will prefer to 
internalize the transaction and enter the market through a subsidiary (Madhok and 
Tallman, 2006). 
The TCE framework provides an indication of when certain products or services are 
internalized and when firms prefer outsourcing to the market, based on relative cost and 
risk considerations associated with a given operation. The key consideration of TCE is to 
select the governance form that will minimize the sum of transaction costs (Zhao et al., 
2004).  
 The cumulative understanding of the TCE determinants in relation to offshoring is mixed 
and inconclusive, with disparate results and inconsistent findings with a range of 
methodologies applied (Zhao et al., 2004). In 2004, Zhao published a meta-analytical 
review, including a review of 38 empirical studies from the period 1986-2002, based on 
transaction cost theory. The study offers a comprehensive review of empirical findings from 
prior studies in regard to the predictive abilities of TCE, including the application of 
external uncertainty (Zhao et al., 2004).  Zhao’s et al. (2004) meta-analysis highlights the 
impact of moderators on predictions, including the effect of the country of origin, location 
and industry type in various TCE based studies. The moderating effect of country of origin 
refers to findings suggesting that the effects of cultural distance, international experience 
and advertising intensity vary significantly, depending on firm’s home country. The effect of 
industry type is generally found to moderate all TCE variables, suggesting that TCE 
determinants are industry specific.  
While TCE points to external uncertainty as a decisive factor in offshoring, it has not been 
conclusive on how and when external uncertainty affects the strategic offshoring decision, 
and how perception of external uncertainty, and corresponding firm behaviour, might vary 
depending on industry and firm specific attributes.  
 
2.3 Political risk manifestations in offshoring 
A review of the extant literature on political risk in offshoring was used to map the key 
political dimensions and their underlying manifestations. Table 1 presents an overview of 
key political risk dimensions, identified through a systematic review of the political risk 
literature comprising of 115 key papers published in the period 1970 – 2015. The table 
presents the individual research focus areas within the political risk domain using the 
overall risk categorizations presented by Miller (1992), Agarwal and Feils (2007) and Rao 
and Goldsby (2009) as well as the work of Busse and Hefeker (2007).  Following Agarwal 
and Feils (2007), we have included not only political but also economic variables as part of a 
comprehensive political risk framework. 
 
 
 Table 1.  Political risk typology dimensions from the extant literature 
Political instability  Political instability and turmoil (Brewer, 1983; Coplin and O'Leary, 1983; 
Goodman and Ramer, 2007; Liuhto et al., 2009; Oetzel, 2005; Robock, 
1971; Wade, 2005; Herath and Kishore, 2009; Kobrin, 1981; Kumar and 
Sosnoski, 2009; Rios-Morales 2009; Ho et al., 2015); election upheaval 
(Oetzel, 2005); changes in political system and stability of ruling party 
(Agarwal and Feils, 2007); and internal conflict (Busse and Hefeker, 2007); 
instability of neighbour countries (Oetzel, 2005; Tummala and Schoenherr, 
2011; Ho, et al. 2015) and external regional threats (Busse and Hefeker, 
2007). 
Instability of socio-
economic 
environment 
Social stability or socio-cultural differences (Leavy, 1984; Ho, et al. 2015); in 
terms of considering the level of ethnic divide and religious tension (Busse 
and Hefeker, 2007); the presence of socio-political grievances (Busse and 
Hefeker, 2007); or in terms of consequence and focusing on social unrest 
(Liuhto et al., 2009; Sameer Kumar et al., 2009) and law and order 
(Gholami 2012). More recently research has considered unemployment 
(Liuhto et al., 2009). 
Macro-economic 
instability 
Level of foreign debt (Agarwal and Feils, 2007); currency exchange 
fluctuations and stability of exchange rates (Agarwal and Feils, 2007; 
Herath and Kishore, 2009; Liuhto et al., 2009; Oetzel, 2005) 
Policy predictability Frequent changes of government policy and regulation (Agarwal and Feils, 
2007; Brewer, 1993; Miller, 1992; Oetzel, 2005; Tummala and Schoenherr, 
2011; Ho, et al. 2015) including issues such as: fiscal and monetary reforms 
(Miller, 1992); price controls (Miller, 1992); trade restrictions (Miller, 
1992); nationalization (Miller, 1992); barriers to earnings repatriation 
(Miller, 1992). 
Institutional capacity 
limitations 
Corruption (Busse and Hefeker, 2007; Rios-Morales 2009; Wade, 2005); or 
corrupt local government (Oetzel, 2005); bureaucracy (Busse and Hefeker, 
2007); or quality of bureaucracy (Gholami, 2012; Herath and Kishore, 
2009), or degree of red tape; (Agarwal and Feils, 2007). 
Legal unpredictability 
 
Legal predictability (Busse and Hefeker, 2007); accountability (Herath and 
Kishore, 2009; Gholami, 2012); privacy rules (Gholami, 2012), loss of 
intellectual property rights - (Weiss and Azaran, 2007; Sameer Kumar et al., 
2009; Herath and Kishore, 2009), compliance risk, relating to local laws and 
regulations, and their impact on offshoring activities (Narender, 1997; 
Weiss, 2007; Kumar, et al., 2009). 
 
A number of indices produced by global institutions can support the assessment of business risk 
including: the Global Competitive Index (GCI), Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
(CPIA), The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), Ease of doing business (World Bank), 
Heritage Foundation’s Economic Freedom Index (EFI), Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 
Bertelsmann’s Transformation Status Index (TSI) and Opacity Index, Political Constraint Index.  
While these indices can provide a general indication of the level of risk that can affect business 
 operations in a particular country, none of them drills down on the specific political risk and 
how they can influence offshoring decisions. 
This research focuses on identifying and categorizing political risk experience in offshoring 
engagements and determine the level of functional impact on business activities. The 
research will identify both political risk manifestations and the perceived impact on 
business activities to provide a deeper understanding of political risk dynamics in 
offshoring operations.  
 
3 Research method  
The research design is focused on the risk perceptions of practitioners consistent with the 
risk management literature (e.g. Zisidin and Wagner, 2010), which suggests that risk is 
experienced as a matter of subjective assessment as represented in the individual 
perception, as the detection and assessment of risk still requires thinking, judgment and 
decision-making by an individual (Zuckerman, 2007). In a managerial context, it is further 
suggested that it is the aggregation and interaction of these individual assessments, in 
relatively small organizational groupings, that drive business strategies (Smith, 2008). 
On this basis the research design focused on the risk perceptions of offshoring practitioners, 
as these perceptions are assumed to form the basis for managerial decision-making on 
offshoring considerations. The key informant is therefore the practitioner, either at the level 
of offshoring manager or advisor, being aware of political risk manifestations across the 
offshoring project. The study follows a line of previous research of supply chain risk 
focussing on reviewing managerial perceptions in an attempt to assess and manage 
corresponding risks. Ellis et al. (2010) suggest that it is the perceptions of risk, rather than 
objective measures, that drive buyers’ behaviour.  Further, a study across five organisations 
(Zsidisin and Wagner, 2010) showed that practitioners’ perceptions of risk from suppliers 
(as well as the risk that emanates from the overall market in which suppliers compete) are a 
good indicator of how often that risk actually occurs in the form of supply disruptions.  In 
contrast, practitioners’ perceptions of risks from the extended supply chain were negatively 
associated with actual supply disruptions; therefore perceptions of supplier risks beyond 
the first or second tier may not be reliable. Consequently, it was judged to be reasonable to 
study risk perceptions of the first or second tier suppliers and the associated supply market.   
 Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that the risk perception does not necessarily constitute 
objective reality (Smith, 2008). To limit this challenge the research applies an evidence-
based approach by eliciting political risk manifestations that have had a direct impact on 
the offshoring operations by focusing on actual offshore engagement cases.  By focusing on 
engagement-specific political risk events, which the informants were directly involved in, 
the research limits eliciting generic perceptions of risk that the individual manager may 
have solicited from the general environment. This approach is designed to limit heuristic 
bias in terms of identifying the actual political risk manifestations experienced. In terms of 
rating the impact of risk manifestations, the assumption is that whether or not the risk 
perceptions of the practitioners are accurate, they remain relevant as they become true in 
their consequence. 
The research was conducted through the method of semi-structured interviews with 
individual offshoring practitioners responsible for establishing, maintaining or advising on 
extended service chains. As a basis for exploring the underlying constructs of risk 
perceptions the method of Repertory Grid Technique (RGT) was applied for data extraction 
and analysis. 
3.1 Implementation of the Repertory Grid Technique (RGT) 
The Repertory Grid analysis method, stems from Personal Construct Theory (PCT) 
introduced by George Kelly (1955) as a form of structured interviewing, enabling the 
respondents to articulate their views on complex issues (Goffin et al., 2006; 2012; Stewart, 
et al., 1981). The PCT framework is based on the notion that in order to make sense of the 
world people develop rules by which they view and categorize situations, people, 
relationships and objects, and almost any phenomenon with which they are confronted. The 
approach assumes that all individuals develop and test constructs as a way of explaining 
and anticipating events, and that these constructs will be constantly updated, as they prove 
useful or less useful in interpreting events (Goffin, 2009).  RGT has been utilized at least 78 
times in management studies in the period 2002-2012 (Goffin, et al., 2012), and it has been 
applied in a number of business contexts including marketing (Lemke, et al. 2011; Marsden 
and Littler, 2000), human resource management (Anderson, 1990; Goffin, 1994; Senior and 
Swailes, 2004) and operations and supply chain management (Goffin et al., 2006; 2012; 
Lemke, et al., 2003; Mangan et al., 2004; Vandevelde and Van Dierdonck, 2003).   
 The following subsections outline the design of the Repertory Grid Approach, as applied for 
this study, and the interview script is included in Appendix 1. 
3.1.1 Eliciting elements 
Following an introduction to the research objective and methodology, the interviewees 
were asked to identify up to six offshore outsourcing engagements that they were involved 
in where their firm experienced political risk exposure that affected the company’s 
operation. These cases were then classified in terms of activity type, host location, buyer 
location, industry and entry mode type, and written on random pre-numbered cards (I.e. 5; 
1; 4; 3; 2; 6). 
3.1.2 Eliciting constructs 
For the purpose of eliciting risk constructs, groups of three cards (triads) were selected and 
presented to the interviewee who was asked to compare them. The elements were 
presented using the dyadic method where two elements are changed for every presentation 
(Goffin, 2009). 
A key component of construct elicitation is the question posed with each triad. The 
interviewer asked “please think about how two of these cases are similar or different from the 
3rd in terms of impact on your offshore outsourcing operation”. The interviewee explanations 
of how two of the elements are similar and different from the third, constitute the 
interviewees risk constructs, or the attributes on which the interviewee differentiates 
between the risks.  
3.1.3 Rating elements 
Following the extraction of the risk constructs, the interviewee was asked to rate the triad 
elements on a pre-decided scale against each specific risk construct, including all other 
elements (outsourcing engagements) and enter on the pre-prepared grid against a 1-5 scale. 
Previous studies have highlighted that while various scales have been used in repertory grid 
testing, the choice of number of points on the scale is situational i.e. if the respondents are 
sophisticated they can deal with more complicated scales (Goffin, 1994). While the 1 to 5 
scale is most common, previous research has applied both seven or nine-point scales to 
present greater opportunity for discriminatory judgment (Hudson, 1974, cited in Goffin, 
 1994). On this note the pilot phase concluded that the 5 point-scale was best understood by 
respondents and therefore determined the best fit for the proposed study. 
3.1 Data collection 
Access to outsourcing practitioners was facilitated through the International Association of 
Outsourcing Practitioners (IAOP); the leading professional association for organizations and 
individuals involved in outsourcing and offshoring, and with a community of more than 
120,000 members worldwide. The identification of interviewees through the pool of IAOP 
members supports the notion of systematic sampling and verifiable data collection, 
reinforcing credibility of the research project in line with academic standards. Furthermore, 
the cross-industry and geographical scope of membership allows for sample diversification, 
minimizing country bias and further enhancing generalizability of the findings.  
As the research seeks to identify the political risk experience and impact perceptions of 
significance among individual offshoring practitioners, a qualitative interview approach 
following the RGT was applied.  This technique for data extraction and analysis was used as 
the primary tool for exploring the underlying constructs of risk and the perceptions of 
impact on offshoring operations.  In total 25 interviews were conducted, involving 91 
offshore engagements, which are the main unit of analysis for the study. 
There were two essential tools for interviewing: the interview script (Appendix 1) and the 
pre-prepared blank grid. The script includes the introductory explanation for the 
interviewee and the question to be asked as each triad is presented. The blank grid is 
annotated with constructs and respective ratings during the interview accordingly.  Hence 
each interview generates one grid. 
 
3.2 Sample distribution 
An initial pilot phase involved 5 non-Repgrid open-ended interviews with key informants in 
order to garner general views about political risk manifestations and their impact on 
offshoring. These interviews helped to confirm the relevance of political risk for offshoring 
decisions and the availability of data (i.e. multiple cases) for full Repgrid interviews. 
 The main phase of data collection involved a total of 25 interviews with outsourcing 
practitioners during the period between April 2013 and August 2014, all lasting between 
45-70 minutes. Of the 25 interviewees, 16 represented North American-based companies 
(64%), 7 European (28%), one Australian firm (4%), and one from Malaysia (4%).  All the 
participants were in senior positions and involved in outsourcing for a minimum of 10 
years.  The regional distribution of the sample cases of offshore outsourcing engagements, 
presented in Table 2, indicates a global spread covering all major regions of economic 
activity.  The samples were diversified across industries with the main industry segment 
being pharmaceuticals (19.7%), banking and financial services (14.3%), healthcare 
industry, software development industry (13.2%), web based consumer industry (6.6%), 
telecoms (5.5%), public utilities (5.5%), insurance & re-insurance (4.4%) and the gaming 
industry (4.4%).  
The interviews yielded a total of 91 offshore outsourcing engagements or events with 32 
BPO engagements, 33 ITO engagements and 26 KPO engagements (as shown in Table 3). In 
addition to the 91 offshore cases, an additional 6 events were considered onshore 
outsourcing engagements, meaning that both companies are based within the same country, 
and hence removed from the sample pool.  
Participants were selected based on their level of seniority and experience in outsourcing. 
All the participants were in senior positions and involved in outsourcing for minimum 10 
years.  Positions included Director, Vice President of Operations, Operations Manager and 
Outsourcing Manager. In addition, 5 interviews were conducted, which did not yield a 
Repgrid matrix and therefore not included in the analysis, however included as a source of 
background information.  
 
Table 2: Regional distribution of sample cases 
Host region No. events (%) Host countries 
South Asia 28 30.8 India, Bangladesh 
East Asia 17 18.7 China, Philippines, Vietnam 
Europe (EU) 16 17.6 
Latvia, Estonia Croatia, Hungary, Poland 
and Romania, UK, France, Germany 
 South & Central America  9 9.9 Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica and Mexico 
Europe (Non-EU) 8 8.8 Belarus, Russia and Ukraine 
North America 7 7.7 Canada 
Middle East and North 
Africa 
3 3.3 Egypt, Oman 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2 2.2 Kenya, South Africa 
Australia 1 1.0 Australia 
Total 91 100  
 
Table 3: Overview of cases by offshoring activity 
No. Interviewees 
Offshoring activity 
Total Offshore 
Engagements 
Offshore entry mode 
BPO ITO KPO 
Owned 
(Insourcing) 
Contract-based 
(Outsourcing) 
25 32 33 26 91 19 72 
 
The last 5 interviews (20% of respondents) yielded 7 constructs, namely: Exchange rate 
fluctuations, Organized Crime, Organized Labor & Transport Strikes, Restrictive Labor 
Laws, Institutional Bureaucracy, Corruption and Loss of IP. All of these constructs had been 
identified repeatedly by previous respondents indicating that the point of theoretical 
saturation had been reached. 
 
3.3 Data analysis 
All the interviews were recorded and the Repgrid matrixes transcribed and compiled in a 
database for analysis.  Each interview was carefully coded and the findings were 
categorized in accordance with the overall parent political risk classification established in 
the literature review. The 70 risk constructs were then grouped according to sub-political 
categories with risk description and associated operational risk implications to enhance the 
 understanding of the risk nature. Table 4 presents a couple of examples of how the data was 
coded and categorized.   
Table 4: Examples of quotes from two sub-categories 
Political Risk Category Political Risk Sub-
category Examples 
Policy Predictability 
Change of industry and 
data management 
regulatory framework 
“I can confirm that they very often change the guidelines, so for instance 
if you say that in XX country it takes 40 days to get this approval because 
that was the case last time. Often you will be told, no sorry, we just 
changed that last week and now it is 90 days. So the handling times over 
there change plus the specifications on what needs to be submitted 
fluctuates a lot compared to other locations”.  
 
“As new regulations emerge the pricing structure changes due to the new 
data retention and licenses requirements”.  
Institutional Capacity Corruption 
“We wish to avoid the exposure of management staff to unethical 
practices with possible reputational and legal implications, and seek to 
train managers in handling these situations”.  
 
“Corruption is a reflection of different ground rules and detracts from the 
outsourcing activity being a success”. 
 
The frequency of mention was then calculated based on the risk sub-groupings across the 
91 offshoring cases by summing the number of times the sub-risk category had been 
specifically mentioned in an interview grid. To determine the average risk impact ratings 
that interviewees assigned to each construct sub-category, the impact ratings were added 
for the individual risk constructs, comprising a construct sub-category. This number was 
then divided by the number of times the individual risk constructs were mentioned.  
While frequency of mention is often used as a measure of importance this interpretation has 
been criticized as frequently mentioned constructs can be “obvious, easily articulated, and of 
low importance” (Griffin and Hauser, 1993). A more reliable approach to determine key 
construct categories is to complement frequency of mention with a second criterion, 
average normalized variability (ANV). When a construct category has an ANV that is greater 
than the variability of constructs, this indicates that the interviewees differentiate more 
strongly between the different constraints. If the construct category has an ANV that is 
lower than the variability of constructs, then this indicates that interviewees rated the 
outsourcing cases similarly on a constraint (Goffin et al., 2012). Calculating the ANV 
requires the variability figures from different grids to be normalized to make them 
comparable. The average number of risk constructs per grid was 4.64, which resulted in an 
average variability of constructs at (100 / 4.64 = 21.55). This method has been used in 
 Repgrid to suggest that a construct category with an ANV higher than the average ANV, in 
this case 21.55, indicates that the construct differentiates more strongly between the 
different respondents (Goffin, 2012). 
Using the software Idiogrid, a Principal Components Analysis (PCA) (Jolliffe, 2002) was run 
to see which of the political risk sub-categories were most closely associated with the 
various offshoring typologies i.e. ITO, BPO and KPO. Firstly, the average risk ratings were 
determined for each risk category, stratified by offshoring activity. This was done by 
isolating the grids by activity and then within those graphs, identifying the risks mentioned 
that are part of a given construct category, extracting the risk rating assigned by the 
interviewee, summing up the total number and then finally, dividing the summed number 
by the total number of times the constraint was mentioned. This process was repeated for 
the three offshoring activities and across all constructs categories. The information was 
then entered into the Idiogrid software to capture which construct categories are associated 
most strongly with the offshoring activities.  
 
4 Descriptive Findings 
To present a consolidated overview of the key findings, the results of the 91 offshore 
engagements were inserted into an overall matrix presenting the political risk categories 
(Table 5).  The table provides an overview of the sub-categories of Risk Constructs from the 
Repertory Grid Interviews, highlighting risk sub-categories mentioned by >25% of 
respondents following previous RepGrid research (Goffin et al., 2006; Goffin et al., 2012; 
Lemke, Goffin, and Szwejczewski, 2003). The table also includes details of all the sub-
categories that emerged from the interviews as well as frequency of mention, perceived 
impact and ANV.  The table is split into three sections (indicated by shading), the top section 
includes the key constructs which have above average ANV (>21.55) and frequency of 
mention above 25% (Organized labour strikes was included as a key construct despite a 
24% frequency of mention, due to the high perceived impact value of 3.17).  The second 
section includes constructs with frequency of mention above 25% but below average ANV.  
The final section includes those constructs with ‘frequency of mention’ below 25%. 
 
 Table 5. Risk constructs classified by frequency of mention 
 
No 
Parent 
Political Risk 
Category 
Sub–category 
Political Risk  Political Risk Constructs 
Freq. of 
mention 
(%) 
Freq. of 
mention 
(No.) 
Perceived 
Impact 
(1-5 
scale) 
ANV 
1 Policy 
Predictability 
Home-
country risk 
• Client Country - Change in Audit 
regulations 
• Restrictive immigration laws 
• Client Country - Privacy Rules 
• Client Country- changes in security 
requirements 
• Work visa processing 
• Home-country risk 
48 12 3.21 24.24 
2 Institutional 
Capacity 
Host country 
bureaucracy 
• Institutional bureaucracy 
• Processing of visa applications 
• License Regime 
• Bureaucratic rigidness 
• Delay in visa applications 
• Import/export clearance  
• Under resourced institutions 
• Delayed approval processes 
48 12 3.06 29.58 
3 Institutional 
Capacity Corruption 
• Corrupt practices 
• Risk of management exposure to 
corruption 
• Business ethics 
40 10 2.70 21.75 
4 Policy 
Predictability 
Predictability 
of labour 
regulations 
• Changing restrictive labour laws 
• Changes in HR regulations 
• Changing minimum wages 
• Regulatory changes on labour 
• Unstable labour law/Practices 
• Changing safety rules 
32 8 3.03 22.92 
5 Socio-
economic 
Organized 
Labour Strike 
• National/state labor strike 
• National/state transport strikes 
• On-site labour strikes 
24 6 3.17 21.83 
6 Policy 
Predictability 
Change of 
industry and 
data 
management 
regulatory 
framework 
• Change of regs. on data storage 
• Change regulations - Compliance 
• Changing rules and regulations 
• Policy predictability – data secur. 
• Change in reg. framework 
• Change in reg. requirements 
• Unpredictable reg. changes 
• Industry policy change 
40 10 2.90 17.18 
7 Legal 
Predictability Loss of IP 
• Loss of IP 
• IP - Reverse Engineering 
• IP – Breach of confidence 
• Changing IP policy framework 
• IP - Legal Enforcement 
40 10 2.21 19.07 
8 Legal 
Predictability 
Contract 
enforcement 
& Legal 
Transparency 
risks 
• Enforcement of contracts 
• Lack of institutional capacity to 
enforce contracts 
• Lack of political will or culture to 
enforce contracts 
• Sovereign immunities 
• Laws and regulations / contract 
• Legal risk liabilities 
• Transparency in legal framework 
36 9 2.54 15.18 
9 Macro-
economic 
Currency 
Fluctuations 
• Currency fluctuations 
• Exchange rate fluctuations 
28 7 2.19 17.08 
10 Political 
Instability 
Geo-political 
Risk 
• Geo-political Risk 
• Geo-political instability 
12 3 3.33 31.93 
11 Policy 
Predict 
Revenue 
repatriation 
• Limitations to repatriation of 
Revenues 
4 1 4.00 33.30 
 12 Policy 
Predict 
Audit 
regulations • External Audit requirements 4 1 3.33 25.00 
13 Socio-
economic 
Wage 
Inflation 
• Wage inflation 
• Inflation of cost of living 
20 5 3.12 19.56 
14 Political 
Instability 
Host 
Government 
Stability 
• Regime shift (Party change) 
• Regime shift (Systemic Change) 
• Political/parliamentary unrest 
• Government Level instability 
20 5 2.42 15.94 
15 Political 
Instability Social unrest 
• Political instability  
• Social tensions 
• Election upheaval 
20 5 2.23 21.39 
16 Socio-
economic 
Organized 
Crime 
• Organized Crime 
• Gang violence 
12 3 2.40 13.40 
17 Political 
Instability 
Terrorism 
 
• Terrorism (Hostage) 
• Terrorism (targeting affiliated 
suppliers) 
12 3 2.25 22.92 
18 Policy 
Predictability 
Predictability 
& 
transparency 
of tax regime 
• Changes in business taxes 
• Lack of transparency of taxation 
• Predictability of taxes 
12 3 1.43 20.83 
19 Legal Predict 
Policy 
Change on 
foreign 
ownership 
• Unpredictability of foreign 
ownership 
4 1 3.43 12.50 
20 Policy 
Predict 
Revoked 
subsidies • Revoked government subsidies 4 1 2.75 11.11 
 
The Principal Components Analysis (PCA) helped to capture which construct categories are 
associated most strongly with the outsourcing activities. The information is condensed and 
summarized in Figure 1, which presents a biplot illustrating how well the various activity 
types are defined by the political risk constructs elicited from the interview process.  The 
figure represents the scores for the three types of activity (ITP, BPO and KPO) as points, 
while the vectors represent the coefficients of the different political risks on the principal 
components.  In this figure, the axes (Comp 1 and Comp2) are the two dimensions that span 
the most variation in the data.  To determine the importance of a variable in PCA, Stevens 
(2002) recommends an absolute threshold of 0.3, and 0.722 for small samples.  From Figure 
1 it can be seen that all variables have higher values than both thresholds indicating that 
they are well defined and therefore none of them need to be ignored. The same reasoning 
applies to the activity type and hence it is assumed that the activity. Finally, the distance 
from the activity type to the given constructs indicates how defined the type is by each 
political risk. 
 
 
 
 Figure 1: Principal Components Analysis (PCA) Plot – Offshoring activity type 
 
 
The survey results were stratified in accordance with frequency of mention and associated 
perceived impact on the offshoring engagement. Table 6 captures the stratification of 
survey results across activity type (ITO, BPO and KPO).  The table helps to highlight the 
differences in political risk perceptions according to different offshoring activities. 
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Table 6: Stratification across offshoring activity types 
Offshoring (Total) -Frequency and perceived impact of political risk 
manifestations 
(BPO) Cases 
(N=32, 12 Grids) 
(ITO)  Cases 
(N=33, 13 Grids) 
(KPO)  Cases 
(N=26, 9 Grids) 
Freq. 
Perceived 
Impact 
 (1-5) 
Freq. 
Perceived 
Impact 
 (1-5) 
Freq. 
Perceived 
Impact 
 (1-5) 
Political Risk 
Category 
Sub-category Political Risk 
Client Country 
Political Risk 
Home-Country Risk 33.3% 2.9 38.5% 3.1 22.2% 2.6 
Policy Predictability 
Change of data management regulatory 
framework 
41.7% 2.7 23.1% 3.3 44.4% 1.9 
Institutional Capacity Corruption 41.7% 2.4 23.1% 3.4 55.6% 2.7 
Legal Predictability Loss of IP 25.0% 2.6 38.5% 2.4 44.4% 2.9 
Political Instability Host Government Stability 33.3% 1.2 23.1% 3.75 11.1% 3.0 
Political Instability Social unrest 33.3% 2.1 23.1% 2.3 11.1% 3.0 
Policy Predictability Predictability of labour regulations 58.3% 3.4 23.1% 2.5 0 0 
Macro-economic Currency Fluctuations 41.7% 2.3 23.1% 1.5 11.1% 1.0 
Legal Predictability Legal Transparency & Contract enforcement 16.7% 1.8 15.1% 2.0 22.2% 2.9 
Policy Predictability Predictability & transparency of tax regime 16.7% 1.4 15.1% 1.4 0 0 
Socio-economic Wage Inflation 33.3% 3.0 23.1% 3.3 0 0 
Socio-economic Organized labour Strike 41.7% 2.9 38.5% 2.9 0 0 
Socio-economic Organized Crime 16.7% 2.5 23.1% 2.0 0 0 
Political Instability Terrorism 25.0% 2.5 23.1% 2.0 11.1% 2.0 
Institutional Capacity Host country bureaucracy 0 0 38.5% 2.3 55.6% 3.4 
Political Instability Geo-political Risk 25.0% 2.7 15.1% 3.7 0 0 
Policy Predictability Local Audit regulations 8.3% 3.3 23.1% 2.5 0 0 
 
  
5 Discussion 
The purpose of this empirical study was to establish an evidence-based understanding of 
the meaning of political risk in offshoring engagements and to elicit the main risk factors 
and perceived impact on operations. In this section we discuss the empirical findings in 
relation to the extant literature. 
5.1 Political risk manifestations in offshore outsourcing  
The research led to the identification of 20 industry specific political risk constructs, of 
which 5 constructs are considered key categories (as shown in top section of Table 5). The 
analysis indicates that the single largest political risk concern for offshoring companies 
pertains to home/client-country political fall-out, or change of home country regulatory 
frameworks with implications for the offshoring business model. The home-risk category 
received the highest frequency score at 48% and the highest impact score to match at 3.21 
(on a scale from 1-5). This places home-country risk as a dominant political risk concern for 
the offshore industry. The risk manifestations elicited from the interviews highlighted 
negative media, or clashes with powerful workers unions, with potential for reputational 
damage, as the main concern. The interviewees expressed less concern with the policies 
themselves, but more the unpredictability of application and constant changes, making it 
difficult to develop and maintain realistic costing models.  
Two other Policy Predictability sub-categories: predictability of labour regulations and the 
risk of changes of data management regulatory frameworks received high frequency and 
impact scores at 32%/3.06 and 40%/2.9 respectively.  The former refers to restrictive labor 
laws or country specific HR regulations that need to be managed.  As one interviewee noted 
“labor management has both cost and pricing implications, including exposure to possible 
reputational issues” (Interviewee#4).  Factors related to data management also highlight the 
impact on business ‘as new regulations emerge the pricing structure changes due to the new 
data retention and licenses requirements’ (Interviewee#8). Again the risk for business was 
the perceived unpredictability of regulations on data security compliance, which makes it 
difficult for businesses to maintain price structures.  
 Host country bureaucracy also a high frequency score at 48% and an impact score at 3.06. 
This finding implies that political risk emanating from local institutions is one of the single 
highest concerns in the host country environment.  Other concerns included import/export 
clearance procedures, delays in approval processes, licencing regimes, and processing of 
visa applications for expatriates. 
Corruption was mentioned frequently at 40%, and had an impact score of 2.7, however, it 
was mainly attributed to low-level operations at destination, rather than perceived as a 
strategic concern. In fact, one interviewee stated that corruption did not tend to emerge as 
an issue ‘because these clients come from North America and supplier know it is just not the 
business culture here’ (Interviewee#18). The main concern with corruption appeared to 
revolve more around management exposure and potential reputational risk. Finally, the 
political instability risk categories, mostly associated with political risk analysis, were rated 
at 20% in terms of Host Government Stability and Social Unrest respectively. While both 
were frequently mentioned, the perceived impact of these sub-categories was below the 2.5 
average score threshold. 
Another salient socio-economic factor was organized labor strikes with a frequency of 24% 
and impact factor of 3.17.  This encompasses national or state strikes, particularly those 
affecting transport infrastructure, as well as union activities on-site; “An organized labor 
strike within the transportation sector, like often takes place in India, will disrupt service 
supply as the suppliers staff are unable to come to work” (Interviewee #17).  
Another potentially significant factor in terms of frequency score pertains to Loss of 
Intellectual Property (IP) at 40% frequency of mention level and 2.21 impact score. 
However, this category has a below average AVN which questions the reliability of the 
metric.  Nevertheless, the notion of IP loss was often mentioned in terms of a general breach 
of confidentiality through the use of external suppliers and therefore is worth mentioning. 
One interviewee stated, ‘In fact IP is less a concern because the regulations are pretty clear on 
that and the clients are protected upfront. The big area is privacy of the client or the client 
customers. And that is why legislation that exists keeps evolving. I guess the challenging part 
of that, as regulations evolve; the service provider has to evolve their practice to be compliant 
with those legislations’ (Interviewee#18). Other practitioners stressed that loss of IP was a 
major consideration leading to the necessity of tactics such as service dissection, i.e. 
 services being processed at various independent sites, suggesting that concern relating to IP 
loss be product and service type specific.  The IP infringement issue is also linked to legal 
predictability, and particularly contract enforcement abilities, in a given offshore setting. 
With a frequency rating of 36% the potential inability to enforce contracts through local 
institutions, either due to lack of institutional capacity and prolonged processes or simply 
due to lack of political will. The notion that ‘your contract is only as good as your ability to 
enforce it’ is apparent.  
While a number of the factors identified had low frequency of mention or below average 
ANVs.  It is important to note that the findings suggest that a narrow conceptualization of 
the external uncertainty construct of political risk is insufficient to capture the perceived 
risk exposure of the offshore service industry and needs to be extended with more 
granularity on the types and nature of risk exposure.  
 
5.2 The impact of offshore type on political risk 
perceptions 
The research reveals similarities and differences in frequency and impact of risk categories 
across the three offshoring activity types i.e. IPO, BPO and KPO (Table 6).  The first 
observation is that the frequency scores are relatively similar between BPO and ITO 
engagements. Both BPO and ITO have high frequency and impact ratings on risk relating to 
labour force liabilities including: Predictability of labour regulations, Wage Inflation and 
Organized Labour Strike. Similarly, Home Country Risk appears more prevalent for both 
typologies. Furthermore, ITO appears more concerned with Loss of IP and Bureaucracy 
issues. Based on the sample size of 32 BPO and 33 ITO engagement cases the findings do not 
suggest major discrepancies between BPO and ITO engagements in terms of frequency 
ratings.  
In terms of comparing the ITO and BPO findings on perceived impact of political risk the 
findings indicate a higher level of discrepancy (Table 6). While both categories rate 
Organized Labour Strike as the main impact category, BPO is perceived to be more impacted 
by Predictability of Labour Regulations, Legal Transparency and Local Audit Regulations, 
while ITO is perceived to be impacted more strongly by Geo-political Risk, Home-Country 
Risk, Host Government Stability and Wage Inflation.  
 The second observation is that KPO engagements are more associated with host country 
Bureaucracy, IP Loss, Change of Data Management Frameworks and Corruption. This was 
further confirmed by the Principal Components Analysis (PCA) highlighting a stronger 
association with IP loss and legal transparency and contract enforcement concerns. The 
findings suggest that political risk exposure is closely linked with the business activity and 
the associated exposure to specific risk manifestations. 
The findings also suggest that there are limited discrepancies on political risk experiences 
in terms of frequency ratings between BPO and ITO engagements, both highlighting 
organized labour strike as one of the main impact categories. However, compared with KPO, 
it was possible to observe a more marked scope shift towards concerns relating to 
regulatory frameworks and contract enforcement, and greater impact of potential IP loss, 
contract enforcement limitations and legal predictability.  
The association of KPO with loss of IP, policy change on foreign ownership and contract 
enforcement risks, suggests that institutional capacity i.e. legal enforcement of IP rights and 
contracts becomes increasingly important as the value of product or service is enhanced. As 
stated, ‘Most of the high-end R&D or IP type development or intellectual property type 
development happens in in-house locations So most of the high-end work is done internally 
with their own employees and their own buildings – everything is their own – only thing is that 
it may happen to be in an offshore location’. The reason they do that is they don’t trust others 
to do it– it is about whether they can expose that and still have the right control (Interviewee 
#17).  
Hence the findings suggest that for purely transactional work most firms are comfortable 
outsourcing to third-party, while for high-end activities they prefer to keep the process 
internal, supporting the TCE premise of internalization to avoid supplier opportunistic 
behaviour and minimization of associated transaction costs. Overall, the findings suggest 
that political risk exposure is specific to the nature of the offshored business activity and 
what risk management steps have been taken to address the exposure. The findings further 
suggest that these specific risk exposures be considered in the context of low versus high 
value service delivery as a key distinction for political risk exposure. 
 5.3 The impact of risk management experience 
The qualitative components of the study highlight an apparent contradiction in the sense 
that political risk within the offshore outsourcing industry remains a relevant concern, and 
is perceived as something that can be managed, while there is limited evidence of actual 
proactive risk management taking place.  
The concept of political risk and the implications for operations appear to remain elusive. 
As expressed by one interviewee, the implications of political risk ‘could be a protest, or not 
being able to go to work for a time, or basically not be able to operate locally. It could also be 
power outages which is not necessarily political, but could be politically motivated.’ 
(Interviewee #16).  From these perceptions the concept of political risk and its implications 
are difficult to establish. The main focus seems to be on the monitoring of traditional risk 
constructs, like political stability and social unrest indicators, rather than factors like home-
country risk pertaining to policy changes, institutional capacity and integrity of legal 
frameworks.  
In terms of active management of political risk, the interviews yielded a high level of 
variability. Some companies are rather disengaged, as stated: ‘…once the relationship is 
established we don’t monitor. Unless there is something in the press… otherwise we won’t 
notice (Interviewee #16). Conversely, another interviewee stated that ‘…it is actually a big 
piece of our activities in terms of monitoring these things and developing the risk management 
plans and implementing those plans.’ (Interviewee#11). Others recognized its importance, 
but with a degree of scepticism, ‘Ultimately my sense is that politics does matter and it is 
something they are cognizant of and something they work on and actively try to manage. 
However, I have rarely seen any decision ultimately reversed due to political risk – they slow 
down but they don’t get reversed (Interviewee#19).  
The discrepancy in application of risk management approaches could be attributed to firm 
specific moderators that determine the risk management capacity and risk appetite. The 
risk appetite, or rather the perceived ability to manage risks, appears to be linked to the 
experience of the given firm. As stated, the understanding of risk management varies ‘by 
and large, the larger the client and if they have been exposed 5-10 years, they have a sense of 
maturity on this. For a new client it is an uphill task and a new thing – and marked by lack of 
rigor and clarity of how to deal with this (Interviewee#17). These suggest that previous 
 experience and exposure to political risk has a significant impact on the risk appetite of the 
executives and the firm’s capacity to manage risks.  
 
6 Conclusions 
This exploratory empirical investigation offers several contributions to both theoretical and 
practical knowledge. First, it supports the call for re-conceptualizing of the TCE definition of 
political risk, in the context of offshore outsourcing, to include a broader operationalization 
of governance characteristics like institutional capacity, policy predictability and legal 
enforcement capacities, rather than maintaining a narrow focus on political stability 
indexes.  Organizations need to take these factors into consideration when evaluating the 
risks in global operations, this is particularly relevant to the development of new real time 
data-driven approaches, such as HP’s Geographic analytics (Acksteiner and Trautmann, 
2013) and IBM’s supply chain analytics (Busch, 2015). 
From a theoretical perspective the re-operationalization of the external environmental risks 
will allow a more diversified analysis of a firm’s offshoring choices. As indicated, the 
research highlights the need to expand the conceptualization and operationalization of 
formal external uncertainty as defined by TCE, and encourage research to measure external 
uncertainty by other political dimensions such as government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality and control of corruption in line with Slangen and Tulder (2009). From a practical 
perspective a re-conceptualization of political risk will require a broader scope of 
monitoring, including an engagement with potential home country specific political fall-out 
or policy changes. Furthermore, the analysis and weighting of the political risk 
manifestation types across offshoring activities allows for more accurate industry-specific 
location decisions and risk monitoring throughout the offshoring engagement. The 
intention is to provide a weighted risk index to guide location decisions within the industry.   
A second contribution concerns the identification of the moderating effect of specific 
outsourcing activity (BPO, ITO and KPO) on risk perceptions. BPO and ITO engagements 
appear to have many similarities, particularly on risk relating to labour force liabilities 
including: Predictability of Labour Regulations, Wage Inflation and Organized Labour Strike 
as well as on, Home Country Risk considerations.  However, the risks associated with KPO 
 engagement appear to be different, emphasizing risk categories such as IP loss, Change of 
Data Management frameworks, Contract enforcement, and concerns with Corruption.  This 
suggests that IP rights and contracts become increasingly important as the value of the 
product, or service, is enhanced. 
The findings also suggest that the offshoring industry generally adopts an avoidance 
strategy in regards to traditional political risk (i.e. political instability and social unrest), 
while expecting to manage other non-traditional risks. The notion that political risk can be 
managed suggests that the firm’s risk adaptive behaviour, through active risk management 
should be explored, as the firm's perception of its ability to manage certain risk, will impact 
on the perception of overall uncertainty related to the given engagement.  
This study uses managers’ perceptions of risks, which have been shown to be a good 
indicator of how often that risk actually occurs in the form of supply disruptions (Zsidisin 
and Wagner, 2010).  To guard against using unreliable perceptions of risk, this study was 
limited to risk perceptions of the first or second tier suppliers, and the associated supply 
market, and perceptions of risks from the extended supply chain were not included.  
Repertory grid analysis suffers from some limitations as it elicits constructs and perceived 
impact that are specific to the individual, and therefore it may not be possible to derive 
results that are representative of a population. Similarly, the fact that critics of RGT 
highlight that constructs change over time and hence are time specific highlights the 
question of reliability of the results. The extracted data therefore needs to be understood to 
be time specific of nature. For these reasons the study should be viewed as exploratory 
work, which has elicited constructs which can be validated using surveys of larger samples 
or by using secondary data that can lead to more reliable and generalizable results.  This 
could involve the combination of a number of global indices, such as the Global Competitive 
Index (GCI), the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), Ease of doing business index 
(World Bank), to help cover different aspects of political risk.  
Despite the limitations mentioned above, we find that the use of RGT provides a clear trail 
of evidence which is available for reanalysis by other researchers, and hence enhances 
transparency and provides additional evidence concerning the importance and complexity 
of evaluating political risk for both home and host country. 
 Another avenue for further research is the integration of risk management ability (or 
perceived ability) into the overall function of entry mode uncertainty determination in 
order to explore the (risk) adaptive behaviour patterns of firms, as well as the implications 
on entry mode strategies.  Secondly, while this research suggested that the impact of home 
political risk was sector specific and regional, it would be valuable to further explore the 
actual impact on offshoring decisions and determine whether the risk is mostly rhetoric, or 
real, in its consequence.  Finally, the findings suggests that a review of the impact of political 
risk considerations in offshoring entry modes would need to include measure of 
moderators pertaining to firm experience and business volume. The findings therefore 
suggest that the premise of TCE alone may be insufficient to explain a firm’s offshoring 
decisions and call for further research to investigate the impact of political risk perceptions 
on transaction costs. 
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 Appendix 1: Repertory Grid Interview Script 
Explanation to the Interviewee: 
Introduction and personal statement 
Interview administration instructions 
Biographical data 
Position and title in the company, plus years of experience 
Description of the company offshoring structure and activities 
Role in the design and management of offshoring activities 
Elements - Identification of Constraints (or Risk): 
Based on the wide political risk definition (shared with the interviewee by email and 
reiterated at interview) the interviewee names six offshoring engagements that was 
affected by some level of political impact. 
Write the constraints (or risks) on random pre-numbered cards (I.e. 5; 1; 4; 3; 2; 6) 
Constructs and pole constructs - Present triad and collect constructs: 
The interviewee is asked: “Please think about how two of these engagements are similar and 
different from the 3rd in terms of political risk exposure. 
The political risk construct is defined – Noting that the meanings of the constructs need to 
be probed 
Rating of Constraints (or Risks): 
Rate the triad elements on pre-decided scale against construct, and then rate all other 
elements (constraints) and enter on pre-prepared grid against a 1-5 scale. 
 
 
